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CASENOTES

him in a criminal prosecution, and accomplishing the same result over
the defendant's resistance. When the body is invaded for the purpose of
procuring evidence, there is a violation of the person's rights, regardless
of whether he struggles or is incapable of struggling due to unconsciousness.
The taking of body fluids, whether by drawing blood,' by stomach pump, 17
or by any other unlawful means,18 clearly seems a violation of basic procedural due process.
MYRON SHAPIRO

INSURANCE - RECOVERY VALUED POLICY STATUTES
The plaintiff insured a school building against loss by fire in compliance with the Florida Valued Policy Statute.' The valuation placed
upon the building was $6,500. Two years later, the defendant contracted
to sell the building for $2,300. Before title to the property was transferred,
the building was totally destroyed by fire. In an action for declaratory
relief, held, the plaintiff was liable for the agreed insurable value determined
at the time the policy was issued, and its liability was not limited to the
interest of the defendant in the property at the time of the fire. National
Fire Insurance Company v. Board of Public Instruction, 239 F.2d 370
(5th Cir. 1956).
Valued policy statutes, such as the one applied in this case, 2 are
founded upon what legislatures in several states have considered to be
16. Trammell v. State, 287 S.W.2d 487 (Tx. Civ. Apr. 1956); Turvey v.State,
95 Okla. Crim. 418, 247, P.2d 304, 307 (1952) (dictum); contra, People v. Haeussler,
41 Cal.Zd 252, 260 P.2d 8 (1953); Block v. People, 240 P.2d 512 (Colo. 1952),cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 978 (1952); State v. Smith, 8 Ter. 334 (Del. Super. Ct.), 91 A.2d 188
(1952).
17. See note 7 supra.
18. People v. Martinez, 130 Cal. App.2d 54, 278 P.2d 26 (1955); contra, People
v. Woods, 139 Cal. App.2d 515, 293 P.2d 901 (1956); State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259
P.2d 261 (1953),
1. FLA. STAT. § 631.04 (1955). "Value of buildings insured to be fixed in policy
of insurance."
"Any insurer insuring any building or other structure in this state against loss or
damage by fire or lightning, shall cause such building . . . to be examined by an
agent or other representative of the insurer and full description thereof to be made ...
...in case of total loss the whole amount mentioned in the policy upon which
the insurers receive a premium shall be paid ...
"The insurer shall be estopped from denying that the property insured was
worth, at the time of insuring, the amount of the insurable value as fixed by the
agent or other representative."
FLA. STAT. § 631.05 (1955). "Measure of damage in case of loss."
"In case of the total loss of the property insured the measure of damage shall
be the amount upon which the insured paid a premium.... "
FL,. STAT. § 92.23 (1955). "Rule of evidence in suits on fira policies for loss
or damage to building."
"In all suits or proceedings brought upon policies of insurance on buildings against
loss or damage by fire . . . the insurer shall not be permitted to deny that the
insured therein on such property."
property insured was worth, at the time of insuring itby the policy, the full sum
2.Ibid.
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sound public policies. These public policies, generally stated, are to avoid
the uncertainty which may arise concerning the value of property after
its destruction, 4 to relieve the insured from the burden of proving the
value of that property, 5 and to prevent insurance companies from receiving

premiums on a stated valuation and then repudiating that valuation after
the property has been destroyed.0 Many courts have criticized valued
policies by calling them "wagering contracts." 7 Answering a criticism of
this kind, Lord Mansfield wrote, "A valued policy is not to be considered
as a wager policy. .

.

."I'

But later in the same opinion he continued,

"... it must be taken that the value was fixed in such a manner as that
the insured meant only to have an indemnity."
Fire insurance contracts are treated by the majority of courts as
contracts of indemnity.'0 They therefore stand as agreements under which
there can be no recovery in excess of the amount sufficient to indemnify
the owner of an insurable interest"' in the destroyed property. The
indemnification is limited to the extent of the insurable interest.' 2 If there
is no loss, there can be no recovery under such a policy.' 3 It should follow
that where the loss is limited, there can only be limited recovery. 4 Thus,
if the object of fire insurance is to grant compensation for a property
loss that may be sustained by the insured, and at the inception of the
coverage a valuation is placed upon the property, is this amount a true
compensation for a loss that may be sustained one day later, or one
year later, or four years later? Would not the insurer have to make monthly

3.

Dright v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 48 Wash. 60, 92 Pac. 779

APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE,

§§ 3827-3850 (1942).

(1907); 6

4. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Norris Bros., 109 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1940); Fox v. Milwaukee
Mechanics' Ins. Co., 210 Wis. 213, 246 N.\. 511 (1933).
5. Quisenberry v. National Fire Ins. Co., 132 Neb. 793, 273 N.W. 197 (1937);
Bright v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 48 Wash. 60, 92 Pac. 779 (1907).
6. See note 4 supra; United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 25 F.2d 40 (8th
Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 608 (1928); Tedford v. Security State Fire Ins.

Co., 224 Ark. 1047, 278 S.W.2d 89 (1956).
7. "According to the law in this state, insurance is indemnity,. A contract for

a fixed sum (a valved policy) would be illegal and wagering . . . . ' Norwich Union
Fire Ins. Assoc. v. Bainbridge Grocery Co., 16 Ga. App. 432, 85 S.E. 622 (1915).
But see, Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557 (1869); 19 CAN. L. T. 124.
8. Lewis v. Rucker, 2 Burr. 1167, 97 Eng. Rep. 769 (1761).
9. Ibid.
10. 4 APPLIAMAN, INsUrcC L.iw & PRAcric., § 2107 (1941).
11. Id. at p. 17.
12. Id. § 2602; 1 CoUcn, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW, § 293 (1929 Supp.
1945).
13. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Sheur, 298 Fed. 257 (5th Cir. 1924);
Le Doux v. Dettmering, 316 Ill. App. 98, 43 N.E.2d 862 (1942); Tabbut v. American
Ins. Co., 185 Mass. 419, 70 N.E. 430 (1904); Honie Ins. Co. v. Stone River Nat'l
Bank, 88 Tenn. 369, 12 S.W. 915 (1889); German Ins. Co. v. Everett, 36 SAy. 125
Civ. App. Tex. 1896); Ramsdell v. Insurance Co. of North America, 197 Wis. 136,
21 N.W. 654 (1928).
14. Karcher v. Philadelphia Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 32 N.J. Super, 496,
108 A.2d 638 (1955); 4 APPLEMAN, op. Cit. supra note 10.
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or seni-annual re-evaluations and corresponding premium adjustments in
order to maintain an equitable valuation? The majority rule in jurisdictions
not allowing valued policies is that the face value of the insurance policy
may not be admitted as proof of the value of the property destroyed. 15
It would seem that this is designed to encourage the delineation of a just
amount of compensation in case of loss by fire.
The court in the instant case cannot be criticized for its application
of the law. In its decision it followed the Valued Policy Statute of the
State of Florida as it was written and has been interpreted. 16 As this
case demonstrates, the valued policy, though written in conformance
with a statute, may result in more than mere indemnity. 17 If the statute
were designed to protect the public from the dangers of over-insurance, 18
the instant case stands as an example of how the statute has failed to
meet its purpose. Limiting the recovery in fire insurance to the extent
of the interest of the insured in the property at the time of its destruction
may give rise to problems of defining insurable interests. 20 However, the
measurement of the insurable interest seems to be the only tool which
will completely remove the fire insurance contract from the wagering
category.
It seems that while the valued policy statutes are attempts to solve
real problems, their very presence in the forms used today may give rise
to more serious and potentially dangerous problems. What is needed
seems to be a compromise enactment which will be a more effective
means of answering diametrically opposed problems. 2 Perhaps judicial
interpretation allowing flexibility to the valued policy statutes is the
answer. The courts, however, are reluctant to change statutory inter-

15. See Bonbright & Katez, Valuation of Property to Measure Fire Ins. Losses,
29 COLUM. L. REv. 858 (1929).
16. Martin v. Sun Ins. Office of London, 83 Ma. 325, 91 So. 363 (1922). (The
Florida valued policy statute held not in conflict with the Constitution of the State of
Florida.) Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Redding, 47 Ma. 288, 37 So. 62 (1904). (The
court held that the valued policy statute would not be unconstitutional if it deprives
the insurer of the right to question the valuation.)
"Valued
17. American Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 120 Fa. 674, 163 So. 17 (1935.
policy statutes such as ours will not permit a reduction of the amount of insurance
specified in the policy by reason of depreciation in value caused by use, decay, accident,
casualty, or otherwise, where such supervening cause occurs subsequent to the issuance
of the policy .......
But see, Meier v. Eureka-Security Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 168

S.W.2d 127 (1943).

18. American Ins. Co.. v. laconi, 8 Terry (47 Del.) 167, 89 A.2d 141 (1952);
Nathan v. St. Paul Mutual Ins. Co., 243 Minn. 430, 68 N.W.2d 385 (1955).
19. Smith v. Northern Ins. Co., 232 App. Div. 354, 250 N.Y. Supp. 30 (Sup. Ct.
1931). (The thing insured is not the property described by the interest or estate of the
insured therein.)
20. 36 GEo. L. J. 876 (1948).
21. W. J. Davis, Fire Insurance & the Public Interest, INs. L. J. 1951:461-7.
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pretations, leaving such tasks to the legislatures. 2 2 There is a need, as
illustrated here, for the recognition of the conflict in this field and a
concerted effort toward the fulfillment of a uniform solution.
WALTER

M.

DINGWALL

PICKETING BY UNION MEMBERS WHO
LABOR LAW ARE NOT EMPLOYEES OF SUBJECT EMPLOYER
The Fontainebleau Hotel was picketed by members of a Hotel Employees Union, a minority of whom were employees of the hotel. The
union sought recognition as the bargaining agent of the employees of
the hotel. The Florida Supreme Court indicated that the union had ignored
the prerequisites of picketing established by law, because it had intimidated
the employees and the patrons. Held, ".

.

. that the union as such, and as

distinguished from the individual employees, may not (italics supplied)
under the circumstances . . . engage in picketing by use of members

of the union as pickets who are not the employees of the subject employer."
(italics supplied) Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Hotel Employees Union,
Local No. 255, 92 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1957).1
In American Federation of Labor v. Swing, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech
was infringed upon by the judicial policy of a state forbidding peaceful
picketing that was based on the grounds that the picketing had been conducted by strangers to the employers; thus, no proximate relationship existed
between the employers and the pickets.? In the Swing decision the Court
pointed out that a state can not exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free speech by drawing the circle of economic competition
so small around the employer and the employees as to contain only
himself and those employees directly employed by them.
Following this decision, many courts reversed earlier holdings concerning the unacceptability of "stranger" picketing and established precedents indicating the existence of labor disputes even though the employees

22. Hunt v. General Ins. Co. of America, 217 S.C. 453, 60 S.E.2d 891 (1955).

"Courts should not annul contracts on doubtful grounds of public policy, in such
matters it is better that the legislatures should first speak." Bright v. Hanover Ins. Co.,
48 Wash. 60, 92 Pac. 779 (1907). "To a certain extent the law undoubtedly gives
legal sanction to the wagering contract, but the policy of such a law is for the
Legislature, and not for the courts."
1. For a thorough examination of the background of Federal and Florida law
in the field of labor relations, the reader is referred to: 8 MIAMI L.Q. 246 (1953) and

10

MIAMI

L.Q. 208 (1956).

2. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).

